Abstract-We propose a procedure to formally verify the safety of autonomous vehicles online, i.e., during operation, that considers the uniqueness of each traffic situation. A challenging aspect of online verification is the varying number of surrounding traffic participants, which causes significant variations in computational demand. To guarantee timely safe motion plans, we propose an anytime approach that provides rapid conservative verification results based on coarse model abstractions, which are refined continually if computation time is available. Reachability analysis, which over-approximates all possible behaviors of other traffic participants, is performed for each abstraction. We demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed procedure using the CommonRoad benchmark suite.
I. INTRODUCTION
Predicting the movement of other traffic participants is crucial for motion planning, threat assessment, and formal safety verification of (partially) automated vehicles [1] . Several techniques have been developed based on their intended use. Rather simple surrogate measures have been proposed to warn drivers based on predicting a single behavior of other traffic participants, e.g., time to collision [2] , [3] , as well as combinations of several surrogate measures [4] . In addition, collision mitigation systems that typically require short prediction horizons often rely on the prediction of a single future behavior [5] , [6] . Threat assessments mainly employ stochastic predictions, either by performing Monte Carlo simulations [7] , [8] , which consider a finite number of future trajectories, or by predicting occupancy probability distributions [9] , [10] , which account for infinitely many possible behaviors. A comparison between Monte Carlo simulation and probabilistic occupancy prediction is provided in [11] .
However, none of these methods can verify whether a collision is impossible under certain assumptions about the behavior of other traffic participants, e.g., assuming traffic rules are obeyed. In the concept presented in [12] , the importance of set-based prediction of other traffic participants is highlighted, but no prediction algorithm to formally obtain occupancies is provided. In our previous work [13] , we use reachability analysis to compute over-approximations of the occupancy of surrounding traffic participants. A similar concept has also been applied to mobile robots [14] , [15] . When the trajectory of the ego-vehicle, i.e., the vehicle performing the predictions, does not intersect the over-approximative occupancies of other traffic participants at any time, we
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An aspect of set-based prediction that has not yet received much attention is the large dependence of computation time on the number of surrounding traffic participants. At a busy intersection in an urban area, this number can easily vary from only a few to more than 100 due to many surrounding pedestrians and cyclists. However, the computing resources of the ego-vehicle are limited. Using conventional prediction techniques requires, e.g., performing fewer simulations in a Monte Carlo simulation or simply omitting some traffic participants from the prediction. However, these measures reduce the safety of the ego-vehicle.
The situation differs for set-based techniques, which work with nondeterministic models to capture all possible behaviors; therefore, such models can be abstracted easily. The obtained abstractions result in over-approximations and thus more conservative behavior. To attenuate overly conservative results, we propose an anytime algorithm [16] for set-based safety verification of traffic participants. When computation time is available, we refine the results and reduce overapproximation. In this manner, we can formally guarantee safety while making optimal use of available computational resources.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Definitions are given in Section II. In Section III, we provide an overview of our set-based safety verification procedure. The proposed anytime method is described in Section IV, and example traffic benchmarks are discussed in Section V. Conclusions and suggestions for future work are provided in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some general notation and the concepts of reachable and occupancy sets. Please note that throughout this paper, we assume that all safety-relevant traffic participants are detected by the sensors of the egovehicle.
A. Notation
Let R n represent the n-dimensional Euclidean space. Given an n-dimensional vector a of any set A or a list a of length |a| = n, a i represents its i th component or element for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and P(A) denotes the power set of A, i.e., the set of all subsets of A. The Minkowski addition of two sets A and B is defined by A ⊕ B = {a + b a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
The set of Booleans B comprises two elements, i.e., true and false ⊥. Let ∧ and ∨ denote logical conjunction and disjunction, respectively. The logical equality and nonequality are denoted respectively by ≡ and ≡.
The sensor measurements are updated only at discrete time steps t k for k ∈ Z ≥0 . To simplify parallelization, we consider only a fixed step size, i.e., t k+1 − t k = ∆t, as shown in Fig. 1 . Moreover, the constant receding prediction horizon is denoted by h ∈ Z >0 , which corresponds to the number of time intervals evaluated by prediction at each initial time step t k . Fig. 1 . Fixed receding prediction horizon h at current initial time step t k , and constant step size ∆t.
B. Reachable Set
Typically, an exact mathematical model M exact of another traffic participant is not known by the ego-vehicle unless transmitted via vehicle-to-vehicle communication. Therefore, we use nondeterministic dynamic models that capture real physical behavior. All considered models of different complexity for another traffic participant are contained in a list M of length |M |.
The nominal behavior of model M i for i ∈ {1, . . . , |M |} is given by the following ordinary differential equation:
where
denote the state and input, respectively. The inputs, e.g., steering rate and acceleration, are uncertain but bounded by the set
for all times, i.e., ∀t :
. Based on new sensor measurements, the uncertain initial state set X
is updated at each time step t k , and the corresponding initial state is x
. The exact reachable set, i.e., the set of states x (i) that are reachable, based on model M i , initial time step t k , and prediction time interval
where i ∈ {1, . . . , |M |} and j ∈ {1, . . . , h}. Typically, (2) cannot be computed exactly [17] . Thus, we use overapproximations R ⊇ R e and want R to enclose R e as tightly as possible. In the following, we assume that tight over-approximations are provided for all models.
Model M i is called an abstraction of the unknown model M exact of another traffic participant if the exact reachable set of M i over-approximates the set of M exact , i.e., ∀j, ∀k :
In this paper, we assume all models M i are abstractions, i.e., conformant with the real physical system. If this assumption is invalid, more uncertainty must be added to the nondeterministic model abstractions, as done in reachset conformance [18] , [19] .
C. Occupancy Set
We introduce the mapping
which projects the state x
of a traffic participant to its set of occupied X-Y -positions. For a given set A, the projection is applied element-wise, i.e., Π(A) = {Π(a) | a ∈ A}. The predicted occupancy set of another traffic participant based on model M i , initial time step t k , and prediction
i.e., given by projecting the reachable set R to the twodimensional set of occupied X-Y -positions. The relation
allows us to predict the occupancy set of another traffic participant efficiently by intersecting the occupancies of |M | different abstractions [20, Prop. 5.1]. Thus, the overapproximation becomes tighter each time a new model is added. Similar to (3), the occupancy set of the ego-vehicle based on the known reference trajectory at time step t k and prediction interval [t k+j−1 , t k+j ] is denoted by E k j . The uncertainties due to a non-perfect tracking controller and the dimensions of the ego-vehicle are included in the set E k j [20] . Example 1: A very simple model M 1 can be obtained by allowing infinite acceleration and assuming maximum velocity v max . Under this model, it is possible to compute the projected exact reachable set Π(R e ) of a point mass as a circular disk with radius r = (t k+j − t k )v max corresponding to the prediction interval [t k+j−1 , t k+j ]. A simple overapproximation Π(R) is a square with length 2r. Finally, to obtain the occupancy set of the considered traffic participant, the vehicle dimensions must be added via Minkowski addition.
III. SAFETY VERIFICATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
In this section, we provide an overview of our formal safety verification procedure that uses set-based prediction of other traffic participants [13] , [21] . In addition, the concept of fail-safe motion planning is presented [22] .
A. Set-based Formal Verification
Our formal verification method in Algorithm 1 is executed in parallel for each surrounding traffic participant and has two return values. The first output of Algorithm 1 is Boolean true if there exists a possible collision for the ego-vehicle with the considered traffic participant, otherwise Boolean false ⊥. To this end, we introduce the function any, which returns if any element of the considered input vector c ∈ B h is , otherwise ⊥. At time step t k , the list of occupancies of another traffic participant and the ego-vehicle for the prediction horizon h are denoted by
is the second output of Algorithm 1.
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , h} do
Throughout this paper, we use the following three model abstractions for other traffic participants:
• an infinite-acceleration-based model M 1 (Section II-C);
• a finite-acceleration-based model M 2 [13] ; and
holds for arbitrary k and j, we do not require the occupancy set of a model to be the subset of another one or vice versa, e.g.,
The parameters of these models are primarily based on traffic rules and physical constraints. For example, M 1 and M 2 assume that another traffic participant does not exceed maximum velocity v max , e.g., given by an exact or relaxed speed limit. Moreover, it is checked whether the other traffic participant obeys traffic rules, such as staying in their own lane. If a violation is detected by the ego-vehicle, the corresponding parameter is adapted or removed, e.g., by increasing the individual speed limit or disabling the assumption that the other traffic participant will follow lanes in the future. Otherwise, the abstractions become nonconformant with the real system. The described parameter updating is handled by the function updateParameters, which is called first in Algorithm 1.
Second, our set-based verification procedure predicts the occupancies of other traffic participants at time step t k for all h consecutive prediction intervals via reachability analysis, as shown in Fig. 2 . In line 4 of Algorithm 1, the overall occupancy set O k j for another traffic participant at time step t k and prediction interval [t k+j−1 , t k+j ] is computed. Based on (4), in order to reduce the over-approximation error, the occupancy sets O must modify the intended trajectory or perform a fail-safe maneuver to ensure safety, as explained in the next section.
B. Fail-safe Motion Planning
The consideration of all possible future behaviors increasingly restricts the solution space of the ego-vehicle's trajectory the larger the prediction horizon h is chosen. Thus, the formal set-based verification procedure in Section III-A is primarily used to verify maneuvers with short time horizons. Nevertheless, there exist non-formal long-term trajectories that are initially not safe for all parts of the maneuver while considering all possible future behaviors of the other traffic participants. However, such motion plans can become safe because uncertainty about the other traffic participants' future maneuvers is reduced significantly as time proceeds.
Thus, we use an off-the-shelf trajectory planner to compute a long-term reference motion plan based on the most likely maneuvers of the other surrounding traffic participants, as shown in Fig. 3 . Our presented safety verification method is only applied to the first part of the computed motion plan and a consecutive fail-safe maneuver. If formally verified, this part of the long-term plan can be executed safely; then, the next part along the trajectory is checked for potential collisions. However, the previously verified fail-safe maneuver, e.g., realizing a sufficient distance behind another traffic participant or a standstill, is executed if the verification fails. Please note that the existence of fail-safe trajectories can be proven by induction [22] . Similar to our approach, the braking inevitable collision state concept ensures that the ego-vehicle is always in a legally safe state when a collision occurs, i.e., in a state where it is not causing a collision [14] .
fail-safe trajectory t ∈ [t k+1 , t fail-safe ] Fig. 3 . Comparison of long-term and fail-safe trajectory planning of the white ego-vehicle, which wants to overtake the blue traffic participant. The predicted occupancy set of the other vehicle at t fail-safe and the most likely position at t long-term are shown by the transparent blue rectangle and vehicle, respectively.
IV. ANYTIME SAFETY VERIFICATION
In Section IV-A, we propose a novel anytime safety verification scheme that attempts to verify that the trajectory of the ego-vehicle is collision-free as quickly as possible. While previous works provide a formal concept, none of these approaches are anytime capable, i.e., the algorithm can be interrupted at any time after completing a short startup phase, and the quality of the results improves as more computation time is available [16] . To design an efficient algorithm, we
• reuse the list of predicted occupancies O k−1 obtained at the previous time step t k−1 (Section IV-B),
• order the list of models M based on computational complexity and perform collision checks immediately after a new occupancy set has been computed (Section IV-C), and
• refine the predicted occupancies O k j for as long as computation time is available (Section IV-D).
A. Anytime Algorithm
Our anytime safety verification procedure is presented in Algorithm 2. It has the same inputs and outputs as Algorithm 1 with one exception, i.e., we use the occupancy list of the other traffic participant of the previous time step O k−1 for k ∈ Z >0 as an additional input. First, we check in line 2 of Algorithm 2 if the updated model parameters at time step t k have changed compared to those at t k−1 based on new sensor data. If altered, the occupancy sets obtained at the previous time step t k−1 are based on models M i that are possibly no longer conformant with the real system. Therefore, we modify the function updateParameters compared to Algorithm 1 by adding a return value that is Boolean false ⊥ if the model parameters have changed or t = t 0 , otherwise true . If the return value is , our procedure reuses the list of occupancies O k−1 obtained at the previous time step t k−1 to quickly obtain over-approximations of O k j for j ∈ {1, . . . , h − 1}, as described in Section IV-B. Otherwise, all h occupancies are initialized with R 2 in line 7 of Algorithm 2. In lines 8 to 14, we attempt to verify that no collision occurs for any prediction interval as quickly as possible. This is achieved by ordering the list of models M and performing Algorithm 2 Anytime Safety Verification
9:
m j ← 0 10:
while c j ≡ ∧ m j < |M | do 12:
14:
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , h} do 16: for all i ∈ {m j + 1, . . . , |M |} do
return any(c), O k collision checks (line 14) immediately after obtaining new sets O k j (M mj ), as described in Section IV-C. Similar to Algorithm 1, the Boolean collision vector c ∈ B h stores the formal verification result for all h prediction intervals. Furthermore, the variable m j ∈ Z ≥0 for j ∈ {1, . . . , h} corresponds to the number of models required to verify safety for the prediction interval [t k+j−1 , t k+j ].
If more computation time is available, the remaining abstractions are used additionally to refine the occupancies O 
B. Reuse of Occupancy Lists
We can quickly predict future occupancies of another traffic participant at time step t k for k ∈ Z >0 by reusing the list O k−1 obtained at the previous time step t k−1 . As a result, we only need to compute the occupancy set O k h corresponding to the last prediction interval [t k+h−1 , t k+h ] while using elements of O k−1 as over-approximations corresponding to the other intervals, as described subsequently.
(M i ) holds for all models M i and j ∈ {2, . . . , h}.
Proof: This relation is valid because the considered time intervals are the same, i.e., [t k+(j−1)−1 , t k+(j−1) ] ≡ [t (k−1)+j−1 , t (k−1)+j ]. In addition, the prediction uncertainty for the identical interval is reduced after each time step because more information about the other traffic participant has been gathered.
As mentioned previously, the list of occupancies of another traffic participant at time step t k is given by
Then, the lazy update func-tion, which is called in line 3 of Algorithm 2 with O k−1 as input, is defined by
e., the method performs a circular shift.
Based on Proposition 1, by executing lazyUpdate(O k−1 ), we quickly obtain an over-approximative result for all prediction time intervals [t k+j−1 , t k+j ] with j ∈ {1, . . . , h−1} at initial time step t k . Therefore, only the element O 
C. Fast Safety Verification
In lines 8 to 14 of Algorithm 2, we attempt to verify that the motion plan of the ego-vehicle is safe for t ∈ [t k , t k+h ] as quickly as possible. First, the set O k j for j ∈ {1, . . . , h − 1}, which is possibly over-approximated by a reused set as explained in Section IV-B, is checked for collision with the ego-vehicle using E k j . If the trajectory of the ego-vehicle is unchanged, i.e., E k j ⊆ E k−1 j+1 , and we can reuse O k−1 j+1 , the collision check in line 10 always returns ⊥ and can thus be omitted. However, if a collision is detected in line 10 for a reused set and a changed motion plan, it is unclear whether this is a true or spurious collision due to the reuse of over-approximations. In this case, we verify safety for the first h − 1 prediction intervals exactly as done for [t k+h−1 , t k+h ], which is described in the following.
To speed up the safety verification, we order the list of models M such that M i has lower computational complexity than M i+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |M | − 1}. As a complexity measure, we use the number of floating point operations required to obtain the corresponding occupancy set. Then, we compute O k h (M 1 ) corresponding to the simplest abstraction M 1 and intersect this set with the overall occupancy O k h in line 13 of Algorithm 2. Subsequently, a collision check is performed in line 14. If a collision is detected for model M 1 , as illustrated in Fig. 5a , we compute O k h (M 2 ) for the second abstraction M 2 , intersect it with the overall set O k h to reduce the over-approximation based on (4), and perform a collision check. This procedure is repeated until safety, i.e., c h ≡ ⊥, is eventually verified for model M m h with m h ∈ {1, . . . , |M |}, as illustrated in Fig. 5b . Therefore, we formally verify the motion plan of the ego-vehicle as safe using as few model abstractions as possible, beginning with the coarsest ones. The procedure above produces different verification results, i.e., different collision vectors c ∈ B h , for the same input data depending on the amount of available computation time. Nevertheless, our interruptible Algorithm 2 can formally verify the safety of the ego-vehicle's trajectory for t ∈ [t k , t k+h ] much faster than Algorithm 1, as shown in Section V. In case we cannot verify an intended motion plan in time, we execute the verified fail-safe maneuver, as explained in Section III-B.
D. Occupancy Set Refinements
In lines 15 to 17 of Algorithm 2, our anytime procedure continues computing the occupancy sets O k j (M i ) based on the more complex models M i for i ∈ {m j + 1, . . . , |M |} and the sensor data obtained at t k , even though the collision vector c no longer changes. This is done to reduce the overapproximation of the occupancy sets for future reuse of these sets, i.e., at initial time steps t k+k fork ∈ {1, . . . , h}. Thus, if more computation time is available, the other abstractions are additionally used to refine the overall occupancies O k j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , h}. Finally, after all occupancy sets are refined, as illustrated in Fig. 6 , Algorithm 2 returns the formal verification result any(c) and the list of computed occupancies O k , which are identical to the two outputs of Algorithm 1. 
V. EXAMPLES
In this section, we compare the performance of the formal safety verification Algorithms 1 and 2 on two benchmarks. Our proposed anytime procedure has been integrated into the open-source MATLAB R tool SPOT [21] , which represents occupancies by polygons and implements Algorithm 1. Since collision detection involving polygons is relatively slow, we plan to speed it up using bounding volume hierarchies [23] , [24] and pre-computed collision checks [25] . To generate a long-term trajectory, as described in Section III-B, we use the sampling-based approach in [26] . All computations are run on a single thread of an Intel R Core TM i7-7820HQ with 32 GB RAM.
To determine the computational speed-up potential, we terminate Algorithm 2 as soon as the motion plan is verified. To easily reproduce our results, we use the freely available motion planning benchmark suite CommonRoad 1 [27] , since performance comparisons are highly dependent on the specific traffic scenario. Each benchmark is specified by a unique identifier and contains detailed information about the egovehicle, road network, and other traffic participants.
A. PM1:MW1:DEU Muc-3 1 T-1 Benchmark
To visualize the computed occupancy sets for two consecutive time steps, we compare the two verification algorithms using the CommonRoad benchmark PM1:MW1:DEU Muc-3 1 T-1. The considered traffic scenario comprises an uncontrolled intersection with three other traffic participants and specifies that the ego-vehicle makes the left turn. The initial configuration and the occupancies computed at time step t 0 are shown in Fig. 2 . The step size is ∆t = 0.1 s, and the prediction horizon is h = 17, i.e., we predict the occupancies for all surrounding vehicles for the next 1.7 s.
The predicted occupancy sets computed by our interruptible Algorithm 2 at time step t 1 are shown in Fig. 7 . As described in Section III-A, we use models M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 , which are ordered by computational complexity. In addition to reusing the occupancies obtained at t 0 , it is sufficient to consider only the simplest model M 1 for the first and second vehicles in order to guarantee safety. However, for the third traffic participant, we have to use all three models to formally verify the motion plan.
By averaging the results over 10 simulation runs, we obtain computational speed-ups of Algorithm 2 compared to Algorithm 1 of 33.6, 28.4, and 3.4 for the first, second, and third traffic participants, respectively. This results in an overall speed-up of 7.9 and takes 12 ms in total. There are multiple reasons why our proposed anytime method is not even faster. For example, the collision check, which is currently computationally expensive due to the intersection of polygons, is performed each time after a new set O . Thus, if computing the occupancy set for M i+1 has lower complexity than performing the collision detection for M i , it may be beneficial to skip this check to optimize, e.g., the expected overall computation time. More importantly, some computations, e.g., obtaining the reachable lanes for model M 3 , must be performed regardless of whether the result is only used for the last prediction time interval [t k+h−1 , t k+h ] or for all h intervals. However, the complexity of these computations will be reduced in future implementations.
B. PM1:MW1:DEU A9-2 1 T-1 Benchmark
The second vehicular traffic example is given by the CommonRoad benchmark PM1:MW1:DEU A9-2 1 T-1. It features a three-lane highway, where the ego-vehicle is initially located in the middle lane and must perform a lane change to the right one, as shown in Fig. 8 . Furthermore, this scenario includes two other traffic participants.
Similar to the previous benchmark in Section V-A, the step size is ∆t = 0.1 s, and the prediction horizon is h = 17. By averaging the results over 10 simulation runs for the whole lane change maneuver, we obtain computational speed-ups of Algorithm 2 compared to Algorithm 1 of 43.8 and 50.4 for the first and second traffic participants, respectively. This results in an overall speed-up of 47.4 and takes 3 ms in total. In contrast to the previous benchmark, it is unnecessary to consider the most complex model M 3 for either of the two other traffic participants in order to guarantee safety, which is the primary reason why a higher overall speed-up is obtained.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed an anytime safety verification approach that attempts to verify that the planned trajectory of the egovehicle is collision-free as quickly as possible. The quality of the verification results is continuously improved as long as computation time is available. However, our set-based anytime method would not be possible using simulationbased techniques, such as Monte Carlo simulations, because the concept of abstraction is only applicable when all possible maneuvers can be obtained. Since the benefits of our proposed approach are most apparent in complex traffic scenarios when computational resources are particularly scarce, in future, we plan to use urban traffic data for further evaluation.
